Robert L. Sherwood v. Midland National Life Insurance Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1976
Robert L. Sherwood v. Midland National Life
Insurance Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Samuel King, Robert J. Schumacher; Attorneys for Appellant.
Edward M. Garrett; Hansen and Garrett; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sherwood v. Midland National Life Insurance Company, No. 197614562.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/392
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KF'J 
45.9 
•S9 
DOCKET NO. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
IMl 'J># 'J •, • , \0\ 1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
D?JG::A::I • 
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 14562 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
SAMUEL KINGI 
ROBERT J. SICHUMACHER 
409 Boston Building 
•it Lake dity, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
HANSON AND GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
1Q' JUL 2- U'o 
Clerk, Supreme Court. Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 14562 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
SAMUEL KING| 
ROBERT J. SCHUMACHER 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
HANSON AND GARRETT 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION j 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS < 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE EVIDENCE 
CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO HIM. . 11 
POINT II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
AGAINST APPELLANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES 
NOT SHOW RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 11 
CONCLUSION 23 
RULES CITED 
Rule 56 (c) , URCP > 11 
STATUES CITED 
31-33-6 UCA, 1953 u 19 
CASES CITED 
Ballard v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 
82 U 1, 21 P2d 847 19,20 
Bergera v. Ideal National Life Ins. Co., 
524 P2d 599 (Utah 17 
Page 
Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc, 
94 U 532, 72 P2d 1060 17 
Coombs v. Perry, 2 U 2d 381, 275 P2d 680 . . . 11 
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Insurance Co., 
21 U2d 147, 442 P2d 468 16 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Brewer 
225 Ky. 472, 9 SW 2d 206 20 
Majestic Life Assur. Co. v. Tuttle, 
58 Ind.App. 98, 107 NE 22 20,21 
Pickens v. State Farm Mutual Aato Ins. Co., 
246 SC 380,144 SE2d 68 14 
Richards v. Anderson, 9 U2d 17, 337 P2d 59 . . 11 
Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 
91 U 405, 64 P2d 351 22 
Tanner v. Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-op., 
11 U2d 353, 359 P2d 18 12 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
1 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 105 16 
6 Couch on Insurance 2d, §32:114, p.332. . . . 14 
115, p.334. . . . 14 
134, p.350. . . . 14 
271, p.504. . . . 22 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant held a policy of disability insurance on which 
respondent was insurer. Appellant became disabled at a time 
when he was delinquent in payment of premiums. The issues in-
volve whether respondent has the right to deny coverage when it 
sent appellant a Late Payment Offer and appellant, acting within 
the terms of the offer, submitted a premium which respondent 
unconditionally accepted. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Summary judgment granted respondent by Judge Marcellus K. 
Snow. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Reversal of summary judgment and remand for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The file upon which the trial court acted consisted of 
plaintiff's amended verified complaint, the late payment offer 
(R. 10), and the insurance policy (R. 6). Neither side filed 
affidavits. 
Because this is an appeal from the extremely summary 
judgment, appellant states and interprets the facts favorably 
to himself. 
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Appellant was insured by respondent, the policy provid-
ing him with a monthly income in the event he became disabled. 
The policy provided a 31 day grace period for late pay-
ment of premiums, during which time the policy remained in 
force. (Policy annexed to original complaint, page 5 of policy 
(R. 6) . 
On Fedruary 12, 19 74, a quarterly premium came due which 
appellant did not then pay. At the end of the grace period, 
respondent sent the appellant an offer to extend the grace 
period for 15 additional days, from March 15, to March 30, 
1974. This offer was sent by respondent to Robert Leonard, its 
local agent who had written the policy. Mr. Leonard forwarded 
the offer to appellant noting on its face, "Bob disability ins. 
is due", and forwarded the offer on to appellant (R. 10). 
Plaintiff suffered a heart attack and became disabled on 
March 25, 1974. 
On March 27, 19 74, appellant's relatives took the full 
premium to Mr. Leonard's office. Mr. Leonard's staff issued 
an unconditional receipt for the payment, and accepted the pay-
ment (R. 11). This check was cashed by respondent. 
On June 11, 19 74, respondent sent its refund check back 
to appellant for the amount of the premium and denied coverage 
under the policy. This check has not been cashed by appellant. 
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The equities can go «-:tner way depending -r r " T ^^ ts 
as developed in trial Oi i =s ^ ne hjmj- was apcei.i;:' -.ry.ng 
to take advantage of respondent' u -,n-- .:• trier r*arc. wd? e-
spondent try i rig !:: :: get :i I: .s 
periods when respondent couiar. . . -ar. ::- , * ime per.cds 
for which it would charge prc-miuns * it. not * claims. 
The premium charged appe_ar* DV respor^dr. c ran w.-r.: ,: 
interruption, including the 15 a ay fr^ :- 'Aar ?r 15 t; M^ ;-:: :0, 
19 7 * • - .. - sf use .•:-.* - r-
age st.ci--.i5o r.c cne yii^; ;.dc .^di sed :^ c ru^t been reinstated. 
Thus ^^ spor.dep-. did sc!;c-. premiums for times when it apparentl 
d... c . :iC. i "* - ;LI age 
The policy terms a: r offer terms must *•- examined and 
compar e :i - • *• * ~ 
"GRACE PERIOD: Unless the company has given notice of 
its intention not to renew this Policy as provided on 
the face of the Policy, a grace period of 31 days 
will be granted for the payment of each Waiting Period 
for Accident Indemnity or Sickness Indemnity, which-' 
ever is applicable, and for a period not to exceed 
the Maximum Indemnity Period for Accident or for Sick-
ness, whichever is applicable; provided, unless the 
Maximum Indemnity Period is lifetime, that the Monthly 
Indemnity will not be paid beyond the policy anniversary 
date next following the Insured's sixty-fifth birthday, 
except that if fewer than twelve monthly Indemnity 
payments shall have been paid for a total disability 
of the Insured commencing while the Policy is in force, 
the payment of Monthly Indemnities will be continued 
during such continuous total disability until a total 
of twelve Monthly Indemnity payments shall have been 
paid." 
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"REINSTATEMENT: If any renewal premium is not paid 
within the time granted the Insured for payment, a 
subsequent acceptance of premium by the Company or 
by an agent duly authorized by the Company to accept 
such premium, without requiring an application for 
reinstatement, will reinstate the Policy; provided, 
however, that if the Company or such agent requires 
an application for reinstatement and issues a condi-
tional receipt for the premium tendered, the Policy 
will be reinstated upon approval of such application 
by the Company or, lacking such approval, upon the 
forty-fifth day following the date of such conditional 
receipt unless the Company has previously notified 
the Insured in writing of its disapproval of such 
application• The reinstated Policy shall cover only 
loss resulting from such accidental injury as may be 
sustained after the date of reinstatement and loss 
due to such sickness as may begin more than five days 
after such date. In all other respects, the Insured 
and Company shall have the same rights thereunder as 
they had under the Policy immediately before the due 
date of the defaulted premium, subject to any provi-
sions endorsed hereon or attached hereto in connection 
with the reinstatement." (R. 6) 
Clearly, under the Grace Period clause as stated in the 
policy, appellant would have fallen from grace on March 15, 
19 74, and could not have had insurance unless he complied with 
the Reinstatement requirements of the policy, if they applied. 
On the record, respondent never sent appellant notice that 
the policy had lapsed. 
The specific policy language is extremely important here. 
The Grace Period is for specifically 31 days. 
However, the very next sentence of the policy reads: 
"REINSTATEMENT: If any renewal premium is not paid with-
in the time granted the Insured for payment, a subse-
quent acceptance of the premium by the Company or by 
-4-
,
 a n ag e nt duly author.zed Ly :.ne Company to accept such 
premium without requiring an application for reinstate-
ment, wil 1 reinstate the Poli cy;" 
The underline! .tnauaae OK-- * * - -dir- * r-.- - - - - : r 
requir inq i H ins I .1 - * - a 
"the time granted" tne insured ry .e insurer "" :.- ,anguage 
could easily have oeen Irafted -r - reinsta* nv 
i f the premium is no+- ^ ,. u^n..^ .Ae grace pe::^, . - * i 
the same specific * nys ^rcviued _r: -:.i preceding section of 
the Grace Peru.nl rldubi, , 
Instead, respondent chose to use the nebulous term,"with-
I n the t ime granted " This seems to reserve to respondent the 
right to grant time to the insured to make a payment, which 
time could be different than the Grace Period, If the insurer 
that additional :.:%•:- -ne iJCiicy w( ulc r.r;z na^e lapsec, ~ ::•:' 
r-e m -• posit:: vrier^ f. •*? reinstatement conditions acplv :^ e-
..,;L.-^~ - JJU IAI^ ojjt;^ ii.j.uaii^  ba/ o reinstatement xo not. J.HVUI\ed 
when a premium be paid during this "time granted." 
The crux of the matter Hien *l* - --*- *--r.--" 
a position where he had Lu reinsta\-i trie - o ^ \ i . ^ hicn ~^ er:t 
ha lose? 3 :; -he reinstatement clau-r-?: excludes loses occurring 
••
l
 ~ • -.-  ?'€ ), :: •] : tfh~' . --=:.:-: •;. .:u-i:::r:;. "time 
granted'" provision, as the reinstatement clause only becomes 
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operative after such "time granted" has expired (in which event, 
he wins as his coverage has not been interrupted). 
Now, let us look at the language of the late payment offer 
to see if it did or did not grant additional time. The Late 
Payment Offer (Exhibits B-l and B-2, R. 10) is photostatically 
reproduced in its entirety as follows: 
^ UTE PAYMENT OFFER 
?; y wtv^rot 
-"• "* * »-' y* * 
MO 
NUMBEB 3s: 
QUE PATt 
YOU DON'T-'4 PROVi INSUMilllTY 
Midland National, Life Insurance Company 
t.'f' 
Watertowa, South Dakota 57201 
MAKE Att REMITTANCES PAYABLE TO 
-** ; * 
fc._ HLj 
k p" 
L. 
STATEM^f 
> 
* 
A j 
| 
* • • ? 
.^-1 
-VOv'j 
1 ;$KTra^ 
w'^f." 
••'t t . v -
, THIS OFFER IS SUiJ€CT 
"' * TO THE CONDITIONS p N 
^ THE 8EVBRSE SIDE. 
^ *.. .*. 
«.^ 
PtEASf DISREGARD THIS NOTICE IF PAYMENT MAS AUEA0Y BEEN MADE. 
YOU1 GHACE PERIOD EXPIRED 30 DAYS AFTER 
THE DUE DATE SHOWN* SOT THI$ OFFER GIVB 
, YOU AN ADDITIONAL FIFTEEN DAYS TO PAY . . 
I f A U PHBOMS Nt fUHD A M S 1 U AUVE. 
ACT N O W •- PAYMENT AfTER DEATH W f U BE TOQ UTfcv , 
* A I L YOUt P*EMKJM IN TM6 RETUtN ENV|LOP€. ^ . 
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The language referring - - -
the reverse s J.ci• .»i" r rn • 
verse side is blank (Exhibit d-i P 
reproduced as follows: 
-*>: ; cndi t ic r : - f on 
•e r e -
p h e : o s t a t : c a ] 1 y 
T h e o f f e i: s p e a k s f o r i t s e 1 f , T h e word f lf r e I n s t a t e m e n t f ' 
n e v e r a p p e a r s . P r e c i s e ! ) *o tn«. ; c r r - r v
 ( t h e o f f e r says t o 
the i n si * * ^  " ' 
As t h o s e -. * - C A . - . L I . ; z:*- s eps r e q u i r e d ^ t h e re : n s t a cement 
l a n g u a g e , t m s i n d i c a t e s d p r o c e d u i c o t n e r trier j -
villi S 
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The policy, construed together with the Late Payment Offer, 
provides only three ways of keeping the policy in force once 
a payment is delinquent, to-wit: (1) payment during the grace 
period; (2) payment during the additional "time granted;11 and 
(3) reinstatement. The late payment offer being sent after 
the grace period had run, and not requiring reinstatement, it 
must be within the additional "time granted" clause. 
This interpretation receives support from the policy. 
The policy provides in the reinstatement clause that should 
disability occur when the policy is in a lapsed condition, 
needing reinstatement, that such loss is not coverable and 
coverage will recommence only after reinstatement. 
Yet, as the insurer charged full premium coverage for 
the additional "time granted" period, coverage must have re-
mained in force, or else the company would be in a position of 
charging a premium for a period of time when it did not extend 
insurance. 
The insured can claim that the premium is justified as 
the price paid to keep the policy alive even though there is 
no coverage during the period involved. This is a factual matt< 
not raised by respondent, and, more significantly, the Late 
Payment Offer infers with no language to the contrary, that 
there is no lapse in coverage. Respondent, not appellant, 
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drafted the Late Payment Offer, 
As another aid in supporting the interpretation that 
the disability occurred during the additional time granted, the 
language of the late payment offer states only one condition, 
i.e., that the insured has to be alive at the time the late 
payment is made. This is a much lesser requirement than the 
one in the reinstatement clause, which excludes coverage if 
there has been any disability. It is extremely important that 
the Late Payment Offer does not state as a condition of its be-
ing used by the insured that it makes no reference to disability 
If the Late Payment Offer was a reinstatement offer, its langu-
age would have to be "disability" in order to comply with the 
policy language. The word "disability" appears nowhere in the 
Late Payment Offer. Does this not mean that the Late Payment 
Offer does not refer to, nor is a part of, reinstatement as pro-
vided by the policy. 
Continuing the analysis of the Late Payment Offer langu-
age, the fact that it is literally titled "Late Payment Offer" 
rather than "Reinstatement Offer", has to have meaning. The 
literal meaning should be exactly what it says. If these words 
mean what they say, they "grant" additional time, "grant" being 
the operative word used in the reinstatement clause of the polic 
The Language on the form says, "This offer gives you an addi-
tional 15 days to pay." In this context, the word "gives" in 
the offer, and "grants" in the policy, are synonymous. The 
insurer gave or granted additional time to pay, the words having 
the same effect. 
The other language of the Late Payment Offer, "Act now. 
Payment after death will be too late. Mail your premium in 
the return envelope," is clearly an inducement and solicitation 
of prompt action producing income for the company. That is en-
tirely fair, provided that the insured not in any way be misled, 
and that he be allowed to take the Late Payment Offer as being 
what on its face it purports to be, that is, an unconditional 
solicitation to keep the policy in force, provided only the in-
sured is alive. 
An insured in this situation gives consideration. He 
pays his money and loses the use of it. The premium check paid 
by the insured in March was for $23.73. The refund of premium, 
paid in June, was also for $23.. 73, without interest. He relied 
on the policy in making his plans for what living and medical 
expenses his budget could handle. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE 
THE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO HIM. 
Appellant, as plaintiff below, against whom summary judg-
ment was entered, is entitled to have evidence considered by 
this Court in the light most favorable to him. Richards v. 
Anderson, 9 U2d 17, 19, 337 P2d 59; Whitman v. W. T. Grant, Co., 
16 U2d 81, 82; 395 P2d 918. The Court must 
" . . . review the evidence, together with every 
inference fairly arising therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff . . .." 
Coombs v. Perry, 2 U2d 381, 383, 275 P2d 680. 
POINT II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED AGAINST APPELLANT 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW 
RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, under which re-
spondent was granted summary judgment against appellant provides, 
in part, that 
"Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings. . . show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Respondent filed no answer or affidavits disputing appel-
lant's statement of the facts in his amended, verified complaint. 
Respondent's argument to the trial court was based upon 
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the premise that the grace period of 31 days having passed 
without payment of premium/that appellant's policy was "out of 
force" (R. 28), and appellant's right to coverage thereunder 
was then dependent upon statutory and policy provisions on re-
instatement (R. 28-29). 
For summary judgment to have entered, it must have appeare 
to the trial court from the record that, as a matter of law, the 
policy was out of force. 
Appellant contends that such was improper because: (1) 
respondent's Late Payment Offer can be reasonably construed 
to extend the grace period of the policy so that appellant's 
loss, occurring during such period, would be covered by the 
policy; or (2) if such Late Payment Offer is not so construed, 
that respondent's actions constitute a waiver or estoppel of 
respondent's right to deny coverage. 
This Court has previously ruled on the situations where 
summary judgment is appropriate• In Tanner v. Utah Poultry & 
Farmers Co-op., 11 U2d 353, 359 P2d 18, it said: 
"A summary judgment is appropriate only where the 
favored party wishes a showing which precludes, as a 
matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the los-
ing party." 
Also, in Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 U2d 211, 216 and 217, 398 
P2d 6 85 (Emphasis added), pre-trial summary judgment was re-
versed and remanded for trial: 
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"The summary disposal of a case serves a salutary 
purpose in avoiding the time, trouble and expense of 
a trial when it is justified. But unless it is clearly 
so, there are other evils to be guarded against. A 
party with a legitimate cause, but who is unable to 
afford an appeal, may be turned away without his day 
in court; or, when an appeal is taken, if a reversal 
results and a trial is ordered, the time, trouble 
and expense is increased rather than diminished. 
It is to avoid these evils and to safeguard the right 
of access to the courts for the enforcement of rights 
and the remedy of wrongs by a trial, and by a jury if 
desired, that it is of such importance that the court 
should take care to see that the party adversely 
affected has a fair opportunity to present his con-
tentions against precipitate action which will deprive 
him of that privilege. His contentions as to the facts 
should be considered in the light most favorable to him, 
and only if it clearly appears that he could not estab-
lish a right to recovery under the law should such action 
be taken; and any doubts which exist should be resolved 
in favor of affording him the privilege of a trial." 
Given the undisputed evidence before the trial court, 
the inability of appellant to establish a right to recover was 
in doubt and that doubt should have been resolved in his favor 
by affording further proceedings. That "doubt" is raised by 
appellant's two theories, supra. 
The respondent's Late Payment Offer (R.10) may be 
looked upon as an ad hoc modification of the original 
policy contract or as a voluntary suspension of lapse 
provisions by the insurer. As to the latter, 
"As the strict performance of the condition 
for the payment of the premius on the day 
specified is for the benefit of the insurer, 
it is optional with it whether performance is 
strictly insisted on and the policy deter-
mined, or whether the time for payment is ex-
tended, and such stipulation may be suspen-
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ded the same as clauses for performance in 
any other contract, and may be done by an 
authorized agent of the insurer. Thus, the 
insurer may extend the time for payment of 
premiums so as to prevent a forfeiture being 
declared for nonpayment on the date specified 
in the policy." 6 Couch on Insurance, 2d, § 
32:114, p. 332. 
See also Pickins v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins., 246 S.C. 
380, 144 SE 2d 68. 
Such provisions need not be a part of the policy: 
"Where a life policy provides for forfeiture, and 
an extension of time for paying premium is a mere 
suspension of payments upon a condition, it does 
not have to be embodied in the policy or made a 
part of it under the statute." Couch/ supra, §32: 
115, p.334. 
Appellant contends that just such an extension—a vol-
untary suspension of the lapse or forfeiture provision— 
was effected by respondent's Late Payment Offer. 
It is a general statement of the law—and respond-
ent did not contest it below—that losses occurring during 
an extended payment or grace period are covered, regard-
less of payment of premiums before or after loss; 
"If death occurs during the extension or 
grace period, it is no bar to recovery that 
the premium has never been paid." Couch, supra, 
§32:134, p. 350. 
It then follows that if the respondent's Late 
Payment Offer is construed as an extension of the policy's 
31 day grace period, then the policy was in effect as of 
the date of loss. 
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The premium payment provisions of the policy (R.6, 
paragraphs headed "Grace Period" and "Reinstatement") 
and the Late Payment Offer (R.10) should be construed 
together. The policy "grants" a 31 day grace period 
and contains provisions on reinstatement (necessarily 
following lapse) which govern rights and obligations 
under the policy in case premiums are not paid within 
the "time granted." 
The question raised is whether "time granted" is 
limited to the 31 day grace period or whether it means 
all time provided by the insurer to make payment. Re-
spondent argued below for the former: that once the 31 
day grace period ran the policy had lapsed and the rein-
statement provision governed appellant's coverage. It is 
vital to examine the Late Payment Offer language: 
"YOUR GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED 3 0 DAYS AFTER THE DUE 
DATE SHOWN, BUT THIS OFFER GIVES YOU AN ADDITION-
AL FIFTEEN DAYS TO PAY...IF ALL PERSONS INSURED ARE 
STILL ALIVE. ACT NOW...PAYMENT AFTER DEATH WILL 
BE TOO LATE. MAIL YOUR PREMIUM IN THE RETURN 
ENVELOPE. 
No mention is made of lapse of the policy nor of the need 
to reinstate. Quoting further, "You Don't—Pay interest[;] 
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Prove Insurability[;] Fill Out Forms" The copy appellant 
received was forwarded him by respondent's agent Robert 
B. Leonard who signed his name to the Late Payment Offer 
and added "Bob [:] Disability Ins. is Due." (Emphasis in 
original)• No other conditions appear on the Late Payment 
Offer received by appellant. There is language chat "THIS 
OFFER IS SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE" 
but the reverse side is blank. (R.10) 
Giving both the Late Payment Offer and the policy 
their natural meaning, the Late Payment Offer may logically 
be read as an extension of the 31 day grace period. Pay-
ment within the "additional fifteen days" the Late Paymant 
Offer "gives" may well, and appellant urges, does constitute 
payment "within the time granted" and this case never falls 
under the policy's Reinstatement provisions. If the Late 
Payment Offer extended the payment grace period, then 
appellant's loss was during a period in which coverage 
was in force. 
At best, the language is ambiguous—"doubtful; having 
doubleness of meaning." 1 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 
105. 
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that ambigu-
ous statements in insurance policies are not be be 
enforced against the insured. See DiEnes v. Safeco 
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Life Insurance Co,y 21 U2d 147, 442 P2d 468. Further, 
" . . . any ambiguities will be construed against the 
insurer, since the policy was drawn by it." Bergera v. 
Ideal National Life Ins. Co., 524 P2d 599 (Utah). The 
justification for such a doctrine is ably set forth in 
Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc, 94 U 532, 561, 
72 P2d 1060, 1073, as follows: 
"Insurance policies, while in the nature of 
written contracts, are not prepared after neg-
otiations between the parties, to embrace the 
terms at which the parties have arrived in 
their negotiations. They are prepared by the 
insured, and the company solicitors then sell 
the insurance to the applicant. Normally, the 
details and provisions of the policy are not 
discussed, except that the particular form of 
policy is best suited to give the applicant 
the protection he seeks. If he reads the policy 
he is generally not in a position to understand 
it details, terms, and meaning except that, in 
the event against which he seeks insurance, the 
company will pay the stipulated sums. He sel-
dom sees the policy until is has been issued 
and is delivered to him. He signs an applica-
tion blank in which the policy sought is descri-
bed either by form number or by a general desig-
nation, pays his premium, and in due course 
thereafter receives ,either from the agents or 
through the mails, his policy. Many of its 
terms and all of its defenses and super-refine-
ments he has never heard of and would not under-
stand them if he read them. Such fact is evi-
dent from the fact that cases like this arise 
where lawyers and courts disagree as to what 
such provisions mean. In fact, there are 
about as many different constructions by the 
courts of terms such as those involved here as 
there are insurance companies issuing such pol-
icies. For this reason the rule of strictissimi 
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juris has been applied almost universally 
to insurance contracts, and this jurisdic-
tion, like many others, has declared in 
favor of a liberal contruction in favor of 
the insured to accomplish the purpose for 
which the insurance was taken out and for 
which the premium was paid." 
The rule of construction in 3rowning, applied to 
the policy and Late Payment Offer, must lead to a conclu-
sion that, at least, it is as logical that the Late Pay-
ment Offer extends the grace period an additional fifteen 
days and that appellant's loss was during such period 
of extended coverage as it is that the Late Payment Offer 
does not. Viewed in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment was sought, that conclu-
sion rasies a genuine issue not susceptible to summary 
disposition but, rather, rasies an issue for trial. 
RESPONDENT'S LATE PAYMENT OFFER EXTENDED THE GRACE PERIOD. 
The policy states that 
" . . . a grace period of 31 days will be granted for 
the payment of each premium falling due after the 
first premium, during which grace period the policy 
shall continue in force." 
That 31 day grace period is required, as a minimum, by 
Utah statue. 
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"Grace period - A grace period of (insert a number 
not less than seven for weekly premium policies, ten 
for monthly premium policies and 31 for all other poli-
cies) days will be granted for the payment of each pre-
mium falling due after the first premium, during which 
grace period the policy shall continue in force. . .." 
UCA 1953 §31-33-6, as amended (emphasis added). 
The language "not less than" makes it plain that the 31 
days grace period in the instant policy is a required minimum 
and not both a minimum and a maximum. Since the insured is 
the primary beneficiary of such a provision and he could not 
be heard to complain if the period were longer than 31 days, it 
is conceivable that the insurer, respondent here, could have 
included some term larger than 31 days as a policy provision 
and not be violative of the law. And, if such could be done 
within the original policy, it is as well conceivable that 
it could be done by writing extrinsic to the policy. 
EVEN IF RESPONDENT'S LATE PAYMENT OFFER DID NOT EXTEND THE 
GRACE PERIOD, RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF 
OR ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT LAPSE OF POLICY. 
This Court/ in Ballard v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 
82 U 1,11; 21 P2d 847, stated 
The doctrine of estoppel is applied to some act, 
declaration, or omission of a party to prevent the 
same from operating as a fraud upon one who has 
been induced to act in reliance thereon; as where 
one has thereby induced another to change his conduct 
or alter his condition. The party seeking to avail 
himself of an estoppel must have been misled, to his 
injury or prejudice, by the words, conduct, or omis-
sion of the other party. If he does not alter his 
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condition, or if both parties are equally cognizant 
of the existing facts, so that he is not prejudiced 
by conforming to the course of action on which the 
claim to an estoppel is based, there is no estoppel. 
If an insurance company or its authorized agent, by 
its habits of business, or by its acts or declarations, 
. . . by any course of conduct, has induced an honest 
belief in the mind of the policy holder, which is 
reasonably founded, that strict compliance with a stipu-
lation for punctual payment of premiums will not be 
insisted upon, but that the payment may be delayed 
without a forfeiture resulting therefrom it will be 
deemed to have waived the right to claim the for-
feiture, or it will be estopped from enforcing the 
same, although the policy expressly provides for 
forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums as stipulated, 
and even though it is also conditioned that agents 
cannot waive forfeitures." 
Upon what acts or declarations of respondent insurance 
company may appellant assert waiver or estoppel? In Ballard, 
at 15-16, the Court said, citing 
"Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Brewer, 225 Ky. 472, 
9 S.W.(2d) 206, 207, that when payment of premium 
was tendered after the period of grace had expired, 
the insurer need not accept it, but when accepted 
it must bring home to the insured ary conditions it 
desires to impose, as the insurer cannot accept money 
of the insured, retain and use it, and at the same 
time deny payment was made and repudiate liability 
under the policy, . . .." 
"Majestic Life Assur. Co. v. Tuttle, 5 8 Ind. App. 98, 
10 7 N. E. 22, that an insurer, knowing that a default 
has occurred in the payment of premiums which would 
authorize a forfeiture, enters into such negotiations 
with the insured as to indicate an intention to treat 
the contract as in force, the insurer's right to claim 
a forfeiture for such default is lost;" 
Did respondent, as required in Brewer, supra, "bring home 
to the insured any conditions it desire[d] to impose?" Appel-
lant, without reiterating in their entirety arguments made 
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supra, merely states that respondent's Late Payment Offer 
(R. 10) did not contain the words "lapse" or "reinstatement;" 
that it did not disclose conditions other than that the insured 
still be alive; that no proof of insurability was required and 
that there were not forms to fill out. The only references 
to the policy were that "Disability Insurance is Due;" but 
that with reference to the grace period, "this offer gives 
you an additional fifteen days to pay." Respondent accepted 
appellant's premium check, tendered prior to the expiration 
of the 15 additional days, negotiated it, and, only after 
presentation of appellant's claim, then raised conditions 
and limitations not "brought home" to appellant at the time 
of tender, attempting to accept, retain and use the money. 
Presumably, had appellant had no claim, the money would have 
been retained—giving respondent up to 15 days' use without 
risk of claim. But, without a claim raised, respondent raises 
conditions not known to appellant and uses these conditions 
to deny coverage. 
Under Tuttle, supra, certainly respondent's Late Payment 
Offer would be "such negotiations with the insured as to indi-
cate [if only for lack of mention of lapse, default, for-
feiture or reinstatement] an intention to treat the contract 
as in force." 
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Estoppel requires, in addition to the acts or representa-
tions of the insurer needed to show waiver—some "manifestation 
of an intention, express or implied, that a right is given up oi 
surrendered, and that the party alleged to have waived the 
breach intends to continue the contract in force . . . after 
acquiring the knowledge of its breach," 6 Couch on Insurance, 
2d, §32:274, that the insured 
". . .be misled by the conduct of the insurer with 
respect to his default in the payment of premiums 
. . . . If the insurer at the time of forfeiture for 
nonpayment or subsequently thereto takes a position 
inconsistent with its contract right to forfeit, 
and the evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom 
show that the insured was misled to his damage, and 
the policy matures while the insured is under the 
belief that his contract is in force, it is liable." 
id, §32:271. 
Appellant asserts that the Late Payment Offer was a waivei 
of default or lapse and thatr in reliance upon its represen-
tations, appellant caused the premium required thereby to be 
tendered, that such was accepted and retained. See Sullivan 
v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 91 U. 405, 64 P2d 351, 
"If an attempt to collect a premium after forfeiture 
constitutes a recognition of the contract as being 
in force, certainly actual payment of past-due pre-
miums, and receipt thereof by the insurer without 
conditions attached, must be given the same effect." 
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It might be that as a matter of law, appellant suffers 
injury or change of position sufficient to justify waiver or 
estoppel, simply by his paying his premium and losing use of 
his money. If not, the actual effect on him, in planning 
budget and incurring expense in reliance on his income from 
the policy is a question of fact for the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a proper case for reversal of the trial court's 
summary judgment. 
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